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OVERHAULING  ESA  PRIVATE  LAND  PROVISIONS
IN  LIGHT  OF  THE  RENEWABLE  ENERGY
BOOM  ON  FEDERAL  PUBLIC  LANDS
Blair M. Warner *
“I am the Lorax, and I’ll yell and I’ll shout for the fine things on earth that are
on their way out!”1
INTRODUCTION
Many of us are familiar with the recent rise in renewable energy develop-
ment in the United States.  What we are not as familiar with, however, is the
story of the Mojave desert tortoise and how it succeeded in shutting down for
three months what remains the largest solar energy project in the world.2
Taking a step back, the Endangered Species Act (ESA),3 now forty years old,
has plodded along at a slow and steady pace, with Congress slowly chipping
away at the ESA until it was transformed from “prohibitive to permissive.”4
While the ESA has had the benefit of a significant head start, renewable
energy development in the United States has burst onto the scene in a strong
and swift fashion in the last ten years,5 a newcomer that has developed at an
accelerating pace.  What may be described as a “green clash” has been cre-
* J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 2015; B.S. in International
Business, Pepperdine University, 2009.  I am grateful to Professors Bruce R. Huber and
John Copeland Nagle for their insight and inspired teaching in these areas and would
especially like to thank Professor Huber for his advice and oversight.  I owe thanks to my
family and particularly my mother, who instilled in me appreciation for the meaning of
being a steward of the environment and being outdoors—thank you for all of the camping,
hiking, and creek cleanups that I did not fully appreciate until adulthood.  I am also
indebted to Volume 89 of the Notre Dame Law Review.
1 DR. SEUSS, THE LORAX (1971).
2 Ivanpah, BRIGHTSOURCE ENERGY, http://www.brightsourceenergy.com/ivanpah-
solar-project (last visited Mar. 9, 2014); see infra subsection II.A.2.a.
3 Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44 (2006)).
4 J. Michael Scott et al., Introduction to 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY 3, 9
(Dale D. Goble et al. eds., 2006).
5 See, e.g., David J. Lazerwitz, Renewable Energy Development on the Federal Public Lands:
Catching Up with the New Land Rush, 55 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13-1, 13-3 (2009) (describ-
ing the rapid increase in solar and wind power projects as a “surge” onto the federal public
lands).
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ated as ESA and the renewable energy development “land rush”6 policies
diverge on limited federal public lands.  This conflict is easily demonstrated
by the example of the desert tortoise.  The solar energy project slated for
construction collided with the ESA when more desert tortoises were found at
the site than the project’s ESA permit allowed, resulting in the stoppage of
the entire project as remedies for the tortoise were sorted out.7  In a study
this year, the U.S. Geological Survey has found further evidence of this clash,
as demonstrated by the fact that seventeen percent of biodiversity “hot
spots”8 are found on land designated for renewable energy development.9
This clash between federal green initiatives has magnified the infirmities of
the ESA, and the renewable energy land rush has catalyzed the need for
imminent change in how the ESA regulates (currently, how the ESA fails to
effectively regulate) the habitat of threatened and endangered species on
private lands in the United States.
First, Part I of this Note provides a background of the relevant ESA and
renewable energy laws and policies in play today with regard to the renewable
energy land rush in the United States, chronicling the recent explosion in
renewable energy development on federal public lands in particular.  Sec-
ond, in Part II this Note details the lack of effectiveness of the ESA with
regard to federal public lands and the conflict created for the Bureau of
Land Management (BLM) with the diverging “green” mandates from the
ESA and renewable energy policy.  This Part then addresses the failure of the
ESA with regard to private lands regulation and posits that the expansion of
renewable energy development on public lands is rapidly accelerating the
need to change how the ESA regulates and incentivizes private landowners.
Finally, in Part III this Note concludes by addressing two methods—subsidies
and market-based approaches—by which the ESA can be modified to success-
fully provide a positive habitat protection structure.  By focusing on the ESA’s
private lands infirmities, the United States can provide suitable private land
habitat for endangered species amidst an accelerating need to devote federal
public lands to renewable energy projects and away from endangered spe-
cies’ critical habitats.
I. THE ESA AND RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
This Part first provides a background regarding the evolution of federal
laws leading up to the enactment of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 and
the purposes given for its enactment.  This is followed by an overview of some
of the ESA’s key provisions.  Next, a summary of the development of renewa-
ble energy policy and laws in the United States is given along with an account
6 See infra note 66 and accompanying text.
7 See infra subsection II.A.2.a.
8 See infra note 76.
9 Chris Clarke, Government Study: Big Renewable Energy Projects Threaten Wildlife, KCET
(Apr. 16, 2013, 2:47 PM), http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/wildlife/study-utility-scale-
renewable-energy-threatens-mojave-biodiversity-hotspots.html.
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of the rapid growth of renewable energy development and a few of the rea-
sons for this swift expansion.
A. The Endangered Species Act
1. Development and Evolution
Congress began its species protection legislation in 1966 with the Endan-
gered Species Preservation Act.10  The Endangered Species Preservation Act
was limited in only requiring federal agencies to follow it “insofar as is practi-
cable and consistent with [their] primary purposes.”11  The law was amended
a few years later to add a few enforcement provisions regarding the sale of
endangered species in the United States.12  President Richard Nixon indi-
cated to Congress that he was not satisfied with these existing species preser-
vation efforts,13 and the following year Congress passed the Endangered
Species Act14 with broad bipartisan support.15  Upon its passage, President
Nixon memorably stated:
Nothing is more priceless and more worthy of preservation than the rich
array of animal life with which our country has been blessed.  It is a many-
10 Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (“To
provide for the conservation, protection, and propagation of native species of fish and
wildlife, including migratory birds, that are threatened with extinction; to consolidate the
authorities relating to the administration by the Secretary of the Interior of the National
Wildlife Refuge System; and for other purposes.”), repealed by Endangered Species Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 14, 87 Stat. 903 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44
(2006)).
11 Id.
12 Endangered Species Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (“To
prevent the importation of endangered species of fish or wildlife into the United States: to
prevent the interstate shipment of reptiles, amphibians, and other wildlife taken contrary
to State law: and for other purposes.”), repealed by Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 14.
13 See Bradford C. Mank, Can Congress Regulate Intrastate Endangered Species Under the
Commerce Clause?  The Split in the Circuits over Whether the Regulated Activity Is Private Commer-
cial Development or the Taking of Protected Species, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 923, 937 n.81 (2004)
(indicating President Nixon’s sentiment that “even the most recent act to protect endan-
gered species, which dates only from 1969, simply does not provide the kind of manage-
ment tools needed to act early enough to save a vanishing species” (quoting 118 CONG.
REC. 3140, 3143 (1972))).
14 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–44.
15 See Brian E. Gray, The Endangered Species Act: Reform or Refutation?, 13 HASTINGS W.-
NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2007) (stating that the Act passed the House of Representa-
tives with a 355 to 4 vote and was unanimously passed in the Senate).  Nonetheless, it is
apparent that Congress passed the legislation without a significant realization that the leg-
islation would encompass more species protection than simply “charismatic megafauna.”
Id. at 2.  This lack of understanding of the breadth of the Act as passed was tested in the
now infamous Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill 1978 Supreme Court case, in which it was
held that the preservation of the endangered Tennessee snail darter (dubbed the “two
inch terror” by former Senator Howard Baker) meant enjoining the completion of a dam
within its final construction phase. Id. at 5–6.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL413.txt unknown Seq: 4  8-MAY-14 10:21
1878 notre dame law review [vol. 89:4
faceted treasure, of value to scholars, scientists, and nature lovers alike, and
it forms a vital part of the heritage we all share as Americans.16
The ESA was enacted with the purpose of “provid[ing] a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation
of such endangered species and threatened species.”17  The ESA’s structure
is “short and compact” compared to other environmental laws.18  The U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS) (collectively referred to as the “Service”) are responsible for
administering the majority of the ESA,19 with the Secretary of the Interior
and the Secretary of Commerce (collectively referred to as the “Secretary”)
being the ultimate decisionmakers regarding the listing of a species.20
2. Specific Provisions
Beyond the development and policy behind the ESA, there are four spe-
cific sections within the Act that provide its main framework.  A brief look at
each of these sections provides a glimpse into how the ESA designates
threatened and endangered species and enforces protection of those species.
a. Section 4: Species Listing and Critical Habitat Designation
Section 421 is widely regarded as the “keystone” of the ESA.22  The sec-
tion acts as a “gateway to the ESA,”23 providing protection only once a spe-
cies is classified as threatened or endangered.24  The Secretary has broad
discretion in listing a species and may not look at economic factors—only
scientific factors may be considered.25  Within section 4 the Secretary is also
16 Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
17 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
18 Nathan Paulich, Increasing Private Conservation Through Incentive Mechanisms, 3 STAN.
J. ANIMAL L. & POL’Y 106, 112 (2010).
19 Endangered Species Act, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., http://www.nmfs
.noaa.gov/pr/laws/esa/ (last updated Dec. 13, 2013) (“Generally, [FWS] manages land
and freshwater species, while NMFS manages marine and ‘anadromous’ species.  NMFS
has jurisdiction over 94 listed species.”).
20 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15) (defining the term “Secretary” as the Secretary of the Inte-
rior or the Secretary of Commerce depending on program responsibilities);
id. § 1533(a)(1) (“The Secretary shall . . . determine whether any species is an endangered
species or a threatened species . . . .”).
21 Id. § 1533.
22 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 10 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2810.
23 See Paulich, supra note 18, at 113.
24 SAM KALEN & MURRAY FELDMAN, ESA: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 5 (2d ed. 2012).
25 See Paulich, supra note 18, at 113; 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (mandating that the Secretary
“determine whether any species is an endangered species or a threatened species because
of any of the following factors: (A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or
curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scien-
tific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing
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required to designate “critical habitat”26 and create “recovery plans”27 for
species.  Notably, the critical habitat designation process is the only instance
in which the Secretary is charged with specifically considering economic fac-
tors in the ESA.28
b. Section 7: Species Protection
Section 7(a)(2) requires that federal agencies consult29 with the FWS or
NMFS in order to ensure that a federal action does not “jeopardize”30 a spe-
cies.  Section 7(a)(1) also indicates that the Secretary must review her depart-
ment’s programs in ensuring that they further the purposes of the ESA.  This
is distinct from the section 7(a)(2) consultation and jeopardy require-
ments.31  It would appear that section 7(a)(1) thus creates an independent
obligation on each federal agency, but because of its poor definition no rules
have been enacted addressing this provision.32
c. Section 9: Prohibition on Takes
Section 933 is a critical provision of the ESA—it operates to enforce
prohibitions on actions that harm threatened or endangered species.34  The
“take” prohibition is contained in section 9 as well, which prohibits any
action “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or
collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct.”35  This definition autho-
regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued
existence”).
26 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3); see Paulich, supra note 18, at 113 n.39 (“‘Critical habitat’ is
defined as habitation that is ‘essential to the conservation of the species,’ whether the
threatened or endangered species inhabits the area at the time or not.” (quoting 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(5)(A)(i)–(ii)).
27 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); see also KALEN & FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 41 (“Section 4(f) of
the ESA requires the Secretary to develop and implement ‘recovery plans’ for the conserva-
tion and survival of each listed species, unless the Secretary finds that a recovery plan will
not promote species conservation.  To the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary
must give priority to the listed species most likely to benefit from recovery plans, such as
those in immediate conflict with construction projects or other economic activity.”  (foot-
note omitted)).
28 See KALEN & FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 31 (“Critical habitat designations must be
based on ‘the best scientific data available and after taking into consideration the eco-
nomic impact, the impact on national security, and any other relevant impact’ of the desig-
nation. . . . [I]f the benefits of excluding an area from designation outweigh the benefits of
inclusion, an area may be excluded as long as the exclusion does not result in the species’
extinction.” (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2))).
29 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
30 Id.
31 See KALEN & FELDMAN, supra note 24, at 38.
32 Id. at 38–39; see also Paulich, supra note 18, at 114 (“Section 7 . . . has not proved to
be very limiting in practice to federal actions.”).
33 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
34 J. PEYTON DOUB, THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 64 (2013).
35 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
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rizes the ESA to regulate and limit the actions of private landowners,36 and it
has been broadly defined by the courts.37  Both the federal government and
private citizens may bring enforcement actions against someone who has
caused an illegal “take,”38 whether accidental39 or purposeful, as well as
obtain permanent injunctions.40  Penalties for those who knowingly violate
section 9 include civil fines of up to $25,000 per violation,41 criminal penal-
ties of up to $50,000, one year of imprisonment, or both.42
d. Section 10: Incidental Take Permits
In 1982, Congress amended section 9 to remove some of the harshness
from its application to private landowners, allowing landowners to take a
listed species if they obtain an incidental take permit.43  In order to do this,
the landowner must submit and receive approval of a habitat conservation
plan (HCP)—this involves meeting specified criteria in the provision.44  A
key issue with section 10 as applied to individual landowners is its lengthiness
and complexity—it is possible that an application for an incidental take per-
36 See DOUB, supra note 34, at 64 (noting that the “take” definition is ambiguous, and
this presents a problem because section 9 applies to the general public in addition to
federal agencies); Derek Bertsch, Comment, When Good Intentions Collide: Seeking a Solution
to Disputes Between Alternative Energy Development and the Endangered Species Act, 14 SUSTAINA-
BLE DEV. L.J. 74, 79 (2011).
37 Hadassah M. Reimer & Sandra A. Snodgrass, Tortoises, Bats, and Birds, Oh My: Pro-
tected-Species Implications for Renewable Energy Projects, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 545, 549 (2010)
(“Many courts have held that the term ‘take’ must be construed ‘in the broadest possible
manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can ‘take’ or attempt to ‘take’
any fish or wildlife.’” (quoting Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 162 (1st Cir. 1997); Forest
Conserv. Council v. Rosboro Lumber Co., 50 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1995))).
38 16 U.S.C. § 1540.
39 Reimer & Snodgrass, supra note 37, at 549.
40 16 U.S.C. §§ 1540(e)(6), 1540(g)(1)(A).
41 Id. § 1540(a)(1).
42 Id. § 1540(b)(1).
43 Id. § 1539(a); Bertsch, supra note 36, at 79.
44 See Bertsch, supra note 36, at 79 (indicating that receiving approval of a submitted
HCP “requires an assessment of the likely impacts the proposed action would have on the
listed species, the steps that will be taken to ‘minimize and mitigate’ any impacts on endan-
gered species ‘to the maximum extent practicable,’ and the funding available to carry out
the steps” (citation omitted)).  Incidental take permits were not used with any regularity
until the creation of the somewhat controversial “No Surprises Rule,” which “assures pri-
vate landowners receiving an incidental take permit that the [FWS or NMFS] will not hold
permittees liable for future, unanticipated ecological consequences in response to unantic-
ipated ecological consequences related to the species covered by the permit.” DOUB, supra
note 34, at 150–51.
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mit will trigger both the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)45 and a
section 7 FWS consultation.46
B. Renewable Energy Policy and Laws
1. The Development and Evolution of Energy Policy in the United States
The development of renewable energy law and policy has taken a less
linear course than endangered species protection.  There are five major types
of renewable energy: solar, wind, hydro, biomass, and geothermal.47  Impor-
tantly, the growth of renewable energy has largely been state-led,48 in con-
trast to the federal push and oversight behind the ESA.  This has mainly
occurred in the form of Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) or Renewable
Energy Standards (RES) implemented state by state.49  As of May 20, 2013,
twenty-nine states had RPSs in place.50  K.K. DuVivier has defined an RPS as
follows:
A resource portfolio requirement requires certain electricity sellers and/or
buyers to maintain a predetermined percentage of designated clean
resources in their wholesale supply mix. . . .
. . . The key to making portfolio requirements work is to establish trad-
ing schemes for “portfolio obligations.”  Portfolio standards are flexible . . . .
45 NEPA is a procedural and informational statute requiring federal agencies, among
other requirements, to provide an environmental impact statement (EIS) for “every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment.”  Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., The Role of
NEPA in Fossil Fuel Resource Development and Use in the Western United States, 39 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 283, 287 (2012) (quoting National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-190, § 102(2)(C), 83 Stat. 852, 853 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4331–4370 (2006))).  For a comprehensive summary and analysis of NEPA and its
requirements, see id. at 286–316.
46 Reimer & Snodgrass, supra note 37, at 551 (suggesting that the added complications
of possibly triggering the NEPA and a section 7 FWS consultation may make redesigning a
project to avoid section 10 altogether a worthwhile undertaking).
47 K.K. DUVIVIER, THE RENEWABLE ENERGY READER 14 (2011); see id. at 17–270 (provid-
ing an in-depth look at each major renewable energy category).
48 Id. at 14.  In contrast to the majority of renewable energy forms, it should be noted
that the bulk of hydropower historically has been from federal projects. See KELSI
BRACMORT ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42579, HYDROPOWER: FEDERAL AND NONFEDERAL
INVESTMENT 12–17 (2013) (discussing the distribution of federal and nonfederal hydro-
power projects and the federal oversight structure of nonfederal projects).
49 See BRACMORT ET AL., supra note 48, at 16.
50 For a comprehensive list of renewable energy standards and initiatives within each
state and classifications of the type of standard in place for each state, see Renewable &
Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.
c2es.org/sites/default/modules/usmap/pdf.php?file=5907 (last updated May 20, 2013).
See also Renewable Portfolio Standard Policies, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES
& EFFICIENCY (Mar. 2013), http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/summarymaps/RPS_map
.pdf (mapping states with renewable portfolio standards and renewable portfolio goals).
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The standard allows market competition to decide how best to achieve these
standards.51
The growth of state-led RPSs has been supplemented by the Energy Pol-
icy Act of 2005.52  Title II addresses renewable energy specifically by establish-
ing several programs and incentives to promote the expansion of renewable
energy.53  The Act instructs the Secretary of the Interior to approve renewa-
ble energy projects and prioritizes the development of renewable energy,
establishing federal target percentages increasing to 7.5 percent by 2013.54
The Act even went so far as to mandate that the Secretary of the Interior
install 10,000 megawatts (MW) of non-hydropower renewable energy projects
on public lands by 2015.55  Within Title II, section 109 of the Act establishes
grants for rural communities to promote energy efficiency and renewable
energy, and section 110 establishes biomass grants.56  Additionally, Title XIII
amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide various incentives “for
individual energy conservation and efficiency from automobiles, home elec-
trical and heating conservation technologies, to home appliances.”57
2. The Recent Explosion in Renewables
The recent explosion in renewable energy cannot be fully explained by
state RPSs and the Energy Policy Act, however—high energy prices and grow-
ing greenhouse gas concerns have also contributed to the expansion.58  A
51 DUVIVIER, supra note 47, at 186–87.
52 Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
53 See JONES DAY, ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at 27–37 (Kevin J. McIntyre et al. eds.,
2006) (summary of Title II).
54 Kevin M. Walsh, Renewable Energy Financial Incentives: Focusing on Federal Tax Credits
and the Section 1603 Cash Grant: Barriers to Development, 36 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J.
207, 213 (2013); Kristin Bluvas, Comment, Distributed Generation: A Step Forward in United
States Energy Policy, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1589, 1596 (2007).
55 Renewable Energy, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/pro
grams/energy/renewable.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2013).
56 JONES DAY, supra note 53, at 29–30 (“Congress appropriated $140 million for the
years 2006–2012 for this program.  Section 210 of the Act establishes grants to improve the
commercial value of forest biomass for electric energy, useful heat, transportation fuels,
and other commercial purposes.  Congress appropriated $550 million for fiscal years
2006–2016 for these grants.”).
57 Id. at 193–94.
58 See Jeffrey E. Lovich & Joshua R. Ennen, Wildlife Conservation and Solar Energy Develop-
ment in the Desert Southwest, United States, 61 BIOSCIENCE 982, 982 (2011) (discussing the
“unprecedented rate” of renewable energy growth); Walsh, supra note 54, at 210 (noting
the growth of renewable energy); Laura Householder, Note, Have We All Gone Batty? The
Need for a Better Balance Between the Conservation of Protected Species and the Development of Clean
Renewable Energy, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 807, 819 (2012) (documenting
the positive effect of renewable energies on greenhouse gas reductions); Ben Block, U.S.
Renewable Energy Growth Accelerates, http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5855 (last visited
Mar. 9, 2014) (documenting the surge in renewable energy); Renewable Energy, EPA, http:/
/www.epa.gov/statelocalclimate/state/topics/renewable.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2014)
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\89-4\NDL413.txt unknown Seq: 9  8-MAY-14 10:21
2014] overhauling  esa  private  land  provisions 1883
four-fold increase in the amount of energy produced from renewable sources
occurred from 2007 to 2012,59 with a forty-nine percent increase in solar
energy production from 2011 to 2012 and a wind energy increase of sixteen
percent.60  In fact, the renewable energy push has been so strong that the
section 211 mandate on the Secretary of the Interior to designate enough
federal public land to achieve 10,000 MW of renewable energy development
per the Energy Policy Act61 was met three years early.62  Additionally, tax
credits have been and continue to remain enormously important and suc-
cessful in incentivizing renewable energy growth.63  The Renewable Electric-
ity Production Tax Credit has been the main credit available for wind
energy,64 and state credits and incentives have propelled solar energy
projects.65  Thus, available data suggests that renewable energy investment
and production will only continue to increase in coming years.
(recognizing that renewable energies have the capacity to replace the use of conventional
fossil fuels, thereby reducing greenhouse gas emissions).
59 Ramping Up Renewables: Energy You Can Count On, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/smart-energy-solutions/increase-renewables/ramp
ing-up-renewable-energy-sources.html (last updated Apr. 8, 2013).
60 Laura Poppick, US Renewable Energy Tops Record in 2012, LIVESCIENCE (July 30, 2013,
2:44 PM), http://www.livescience.com/38542-renewable-energy-2012.html.
61 See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
62 Scott Streater, Renewable Energy: BLM Won’t Allow New Mining Claims on Lands
Targeted for Solar (July 5, 2013), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1059983928.
63 See, e.g., How Effective Are U.S. Renewable Power Policies?, ENERGY COLLECTIVE (Dec. 3,
2013), http://theenergycollective.com/jemillerep/311406/how-effective-are-us-renewable-
power-policies (noting that wind and solar power generation have increased by 300% and
600%, respectively, since 2007, and attributing much of this to the Renewable Energy Pro-
duction Tax Credit and state RPS standards).
64 See Renewable Electricity Production Tax Credit, Database of State Incentives for Renewables
& Efficiency, http://dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US13F (last
updated Oct. 2, 2013) (providing details on this corporate, per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for
electricity created by particular renewable energy sources); see also Al Maiorino, Expiration
of Production Tax Credit Is Not Wind Developers’ Only Hurdle, ENVTL. LEADER (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.environmentalleader.com/2014/01/06/expiration-of-production-tax-credit-is-
not-wind-developers-only-hurdle/ (“According to the [American Wind Energy Associa-
tion], the [Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit] has contributed to [a] decrease in
wind costs by 90 percent, and it has helped install enough energy capacity in the US to
power the equivalent of over 15 million homes.”); Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/savings/residential-renewable-energy-tax-credit
(last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (summarizing the residential framework and tax credit amounts
of the Residential Renewable Energy Tax Credit).
65 See Solar Policy Guide: Tax Credits, Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency,
http://dsireusa.org/solar/solarpolicyguide/?id=13 (last visited Mar. 9, 2013).
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II. THE ESA’S FAILURES ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LANDS IN LIGHT OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
A. The Federal Public Lands Conflict
With an understanding of the ESA and its purposes, along with renewa-
ble energy growth in the United States and the statutes involved in its expan-
sion, this Part addresses the ailments of the ESA with regard to federal public
lands.  First is a discussion of the “land rush” of renewable energy on federal
public lands, which has created a “green clash” between the competing fed-
eral initiatives of endangered species habitat protection on federal public
lands and rapidly growing renewable energy development.  Next, this “green
vs. green” conflict is explored in more detail through two specific illustra-
tions: the effects of solar farm construction on the Mojave desert tortoise and
the mortality effects of wind energy on the Indiana bat.  While some advocate
for a “green pass” for renewable energy projects to skirt ESA requirements,
the harms illustrated by this Part provide support for the argument that,
despite the BLM’s conflicting priorities in accommodating both the ESA and
renewable energy mandates, a “green pass” would serve to cause more harm
than good.
1. The Renewable Energy “Land Rush” on Federal Public Lands
David J. Lazerwitz nicely lays out the framework for the “modern-day
land rush” behind renewable energy on federal public lands in particular:
Today, a modern-day land rush promises to define a new era for the federal
public lands, one that will require even greater vigilance to balance both the
use of natural resources and protection of the environment.  Unlike the
resource booms that preceded it, however, this land rush focuses not on
what is in the land but what is available above it—specifically, solar and wind
resources, which are uniquely situated on the federal public lands and neces-
sary to achieve national goals of energy independence and greenhouse gas
emission reductions.66
According to Lazerwitz, this land rush stems from three different areas: mar-
ket forces, government intervention, and resource availability.67
First, market forces have driven the rush to develop renewable energy on
federal public lands because the gap between conventional energy forms and
renewables has significantly decreased; this is due to massive increases in oil
prices in combination with simultaneous declines in renewable energy devel-
opment costs.68  Second, the public interest has helped drive the govern-
ment to implement policies incentivizing and promoting the development of
renewable energy.69  This has been compounded by the increase in state
66 Lazerwitz, supra note 5, at 13-3.
67 Id.
68 See id. at 13-4.
69 Id. at 13-5.
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establishment of RPSs, most of which have occurred after 2001.70  Third and
possibly most important, the federal public lands (particularly in the western
United States) are uniquely suited to meet the siting requirements for renew-
able energy projects.  These areas are characterized by vast, open space with
high levels of sunshine and wind, which is ideal.71  Additionally, these lands
contain better access to large-scale utility transmission lines, which is a
required part of renewable energy infrastructure.72  Each of these factors has
contributed to the massive increase in BLM requests for permits.73  The BLM
has not been able to handle this explosion, particularly in obtaining other
required federal and state agency approvals under the Federal Land and Pol-
icy Management Act (FLPMA), NEPA, and ESA, just to name a few.74
2. The Green vs. Green Conflict
The conflict between the ESA and renewable energy development is one
that should be thought about in terms of reconciliation.  The issue arises
when one “green” goal is pitted against another.  This conflict is particularly
problematic when it involves competing beneficial uses of federal public
lands—the protection of endangered species’ critical habitat and the desig-
nation of the same land for land-based renewable energy projects.  Justice
Antonin Scalia has noted the broad challenge created in trying to harmonize
conflicting uses of land in the context of “multiple use management”—the
statutory management mandate for many of the public lands.  The conflict
between the ESA and renewable energy is akin to the many others that chal-
lenge public lands management:
70 Id.; see also supra subsection I.B.1.
71 See Lazerwitz, supra note 5, at 13-5 to -6 (“[A]s a general matter, utility-scale projects
can range in size from a few megawatts . . . to more than 1,000 MW.  Such projects typically
require large, open, and generally level, undeveloped tracts ranging in size from several
thousand acres to more than 50,000 acres.  They require access . . . to major transmission
lines.  Finally, and most importantly, for optimal efficiency, these projects need to be situ-
ated in areas with consistently high levels of sunshine and wind.  Each of the required
characteristics is present in abundance on the federal public lands in the West, lands that
remain largely undeveloped, crossed with major utility transmission lines, and recognized
as containing the highest density of solar and wind resources in the United States.”).
72 Id.
73 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Jewell Announces Approval of
Three Renewable Energy Projects in Arizona and Nevada (June 3, 2013), available at http:/
/www.interior.gov/news/pressreleases/secretary-jewell-announces-approval-of-three-renew
able-energy-projects-in-arizona-and-nevada.cfm (indicating that “[s]ince 2009, Interior has
approved 25 utility-scale solar facilities, 9 wind farms and 11 geothermal plants . . . [that]
could provide . . . enough electricity to power 4.4 million homes, and support an estimated
17,000 . . . jobs”).
74 See Lazerwitz, supra note 5, at 13-6 to -7.  Lazerwitz also recounts the BLM’s failed
attempt at a moratorium on applications in 2008 in order to catch up on applications after
encountering strong industry and public backlash, and documents the sheer volume of
applications and strain on BLM resources. Id. at 13-8.
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“Multiple use management” is a deceptively simple term that describes the
enormously complicated task of striking a balance among the many compet-
ing uses to which land can be put, “including, but not limited to, recreation,
range, timber, minerals, watershed, wildlife and fish, and [uses serving] nat-
ural scenic, scientific and historical values.”75
Two examples of the balancing problem created by the competing “green”
initiatives on federal public lands, the Mojave desert tortoise and the Indiana
bat, may best illuminate this issue.
A 2013 study by the U.S. Geological Survey found that biodiversity “hot
spots”76 are threatened by renewable energy development and transmission
corridors,77 as up to seventeen percent of the hot spot habitat is on land sited
for development.78  The impact of land-based renewable energy develop-
ment on species fits into two categories: (1) effects of construction and oper-
ation such as habitat disturbance, fragmentation, and human activity; and (2)
mortality effects from wind energy blade collisions.79
a. The Mojave Desert Tortoise Example: Translocation and Habitat
Fragmentation
In addition to possessing biodiversity hot spots for desert species, the
Mojave Desert in southeastern California boasts some of the best-suited land
in the United States for solar and wind energy projects.80  The Mojave Desert
population of the desert tortoise burst onto the ESA scene when it was emer-
gency listed81 as endangered in 1989—a year later, it was downgraded to
threatened status.82  The desert tortoise provides an example of the first cate-
gory of species development impact—renewable energy projects negatively
impact the desert tortoise due to habitat loss from construction, habitat frag-
mentation, and vehicle collisions.83  In February 2009, BrightSource Energy
75 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 58 (2004) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (2000)).
76 “Hotspots” are areas of high genetic diversity, and they are significant because “they
can offer a species a greater chance of surviving future ecological challenges such as cli-
mate change.”  Clarke, supra note 9.
77 See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
78 Clarke, supra note 9.
79 Reimer & Snodgrass, supra note 37, at 559.  For an in-depth discussion of the effect
of wind turbines on avian species, see Bertsch, supra note 36, at 80–85; Householder, supra
note 58, at 807–13, 830–34; Blake M. Mensing, Putting Aeolus to Work Without the Death Toll:
Federal Wind Farm Siting Guidelines Can Mitigate Avian and Chiropteran Mortality, 27 J. ENVTL.
L. & LITIG. 41, 42–58 (2012); and Reimer & Snodgrass, supra note 37, at 563–66.
80 See Ina Jaffe, A Renewable Energy Debate Heats Up in the Mojave, NPR (Apr. 23, 2010,
12:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126173547 (“The
Mojave Desert in southeastern California is the mother lode of renewable energy.”).
81 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (2006); 50 C.F.R. § 424.20 (2012).
82 Reimer & Snodgrass, supra note 37, at 560–61.
83 Id. at 560 (noting that the effects extend to “[a]voidance behavior” as well, in which
the species avoids an area altogether due to development “disrupt[ing] essential activities
such as foraging, mating, and nesting”).
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announced a contract with Southern California Edison to provide 400 MW of
electricity per year through the construction of three large-scale solar power
plants in the Mojave Desert.84  At the Ivanpah site in particular, BrightSource
was warned of the dense population of desert tortoises but proceeded with
development because of the site’s ideal siting for meeting solar farm location
requirements.85  BrightSource received a permit from the FWS to remove up
to thirty-eight adult tortoises from the Ivanpah site and was allowed up to
three accidental deaths per year, but in April 2011 the project was entirely
shut down once it was discovered that far more tortoises existed at the site
than the permit allowed.86
The project was later reopened, but the “solution” involved placing at
least 166 tortoises in a holding facility to eventually release them into land
falling outside of the Ivanpah project site.87  This remedy, often called “trans-
location” or “assisted migration,”88 raises a number of interesting issues for
listed species.  First, it does not always work.  For example, the desert tor-
toise’s instinct to return “home” is particularly strong, and many of them
simply begin plodding back as soon as they are relocated.89  Recent studies
have found that only around half of species translocations are successful.90
Jeffrey E. Lovich and Joshua R. Ennen have summed up the strategy suc-
cinctly: “Although this strategy may be appealing at first glance, animal trans-
location has a checkered history of success, especially for reptiles and
amphibians.  Translocation has yet to be demonstrated as a viable long-term
solution that would mitigate the destruction of . . . desert tortoise habitat.”91
Second, translocation raises a related issue—habitat fragmentation.  A
species’ habitat becomes fragmented when a range of habitat becomes dis-
connected and closed off for a species (mainly through various forms of
human development), “thereby disrupting natural population dynamics,
decreasing genetic variability, and making those populations more suscepti-
ble to extinction through stochastic events.”92  Habitat fragmentation is thus
84 Bertsch, supra note 36, at 75.




88 See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource
Law Under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 171–76 (2010) (defining “assisted migra-
tion” as “the intentional movement of an organism to an area in which its species has never
existed” and acknowledging translocation as referring to moving the species from one loca-
tion to another generally).
89 See Cart, supra note 85, at 2–3 (“‘If I pick you up and drop you off in Kansas,
wouldn’t you try to come back to California?’ Fesnock asked.  Tortoises live long and have
good memories, she said.  ‘They know when they are not at home.  They know where the
water is.  They know where the food is.’”).
90 See Camacho, supra note 88, at 184–85.
91 Lovich & Ennen, supra note 58, at 989–90 (citation omitted).
92 Mark R. Thompson, Keeping the Door Open: Protecting Biological Corridors with Existing
Federal Statutes, 34 ENVTL. L. 703, 703 (2004); see also Katherine Simmons Yagerman, Protect-
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of particular concern in relation to vulnerable populations such as listed spe-
cies.  With regard to renewable energy projects, transmission corridors93 and
roads needed for the conveyance of solar and wind electricity from project
sites have the effect of isolating species populations, thereby exacerbating the
effects of habitat fragmentation.94
b. The Indiana Bat Mortality Effects Example: Collisions and
Barotrauma
In addition to habitat disturbance and fragmentation, a second major
direct effect of wind-based renewable energy development in particular is
species mortality resulting from collisions with wind turbines.95  Along with
turbine blades, species can also collide with power-related structures or be
electrocuted by power lines.96  Scientists in 2001 estimated that 33,000 birds
would be killed annually by 15,000 wind turbines.97  Bats are also highly sus-
ing Critical Habitat Under the Federal Endangered Species Act, 20 ENVTL. L. 811, 824–27 (1990)
(discussing the effects of habitat fragmentation).
93 See Electric Transmission Facilities & Energy Corridors, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., http://
www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/transmission.html (last updated Dec. 31, 2013)
(indicating that transmission corridors are the method by which energy is conveyed to
various parts of the United States).  As indicated on the White House website:
The Obama Administration is focused on building the infrastructure needed
to support a clean energy economy because the countries that lead in clean
energy will be the countries that lead the 21st century global economy.  Electric
transmission projects are one specific area where the Administration is acting to
catalyze the transition to a clean energy economy.  Building greater transmission
infrastructure will facilitate, among other things, increased reliability, the greater
integration of renewable sources of electricity into the grid; will accommodate a
growing number of electric vehicles on America’s roads; and will reduce the need
for new power plants.
Interagency Rapid Response Team for Transmission, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse
.gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/interagency-rapid-response-team-for-transmis
sion (last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
94 See Lovich & Ennen, supra note 58, at 986 (indicating that large-scale energy devel-
opment projects have the potential to worsen the fragmentation problem, particularly
within desert environments traditionally consisting of large blocks of continuous land and
habitat).
95 J.B. Ruhl, Harmonizing Commercial Wind Power and the Endangered Species Act Through
Administrative Reform, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1769, 1771 (2012).  For a startling example of avian
mortality that went viral on the Internet, in which a bald eagle was struck by a wind turbine
blade, see Instantlyviral, Bird vs. Wind Turbine FAIL!, YOUTUBE (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=8NAAzBArYdw.
96 Reimer & Snodgrass, supra note 37, at 563.
97 Id. (noting additionally that “[s]tudies show that an average of 2.19 birds are killed
by a single turbine each year”).  Among the ESA-listed birds that may be harmed by wind
turbines are “the whooping crane, northern aplomado falcon, southwestern willow fly-
catcher, Mexican spotted owl, piping plover, and least tern.” Id.
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ceptible to fatalities from wind energy development98—this occurs not only
from collision with turbines directly, but from barotrauma99 as well.
One of the most high-profile examples of the conflict between wind
energy and the ESA occurred with the proposed Beech Ridge Wind Farm in
West Virginia and the endangered Indiana bat.  Environmental groups suc-
cessfully sued for an injunction of the project on the grounds that the wind
project did not follow section 9 of the ESA in applying for an Incidental Take
Permit, after the district court had determined that “there is a virtual cer-
tainty that Indiana bats will be harmed, wounded, or killed imminently by the
Beech Ridge Project.”100
c. The BLM’s Conflicting Priorities—No “Green Pass” for Fast-
Tracking Projects
Another pressure point with regard to the ESA and federal energy initia-
tives is the competing (and often conflicting) priorities of the BLM.  Under
the mandate of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the BLM is
required to manage multiple uses of its land, which results in “difficult
choices with regard to public lands within its jurisdiction when energy devel-
opment conflicts with grazing interests, wildlife protection, or other environ-
mental protection goals.”101  This can result in lose-lose situations for the
BLM, particularly with regard to multiple competing “green” uses of the land
under its charge and conflicting federal statutes.102  As previously discussed
in subsection II.A.1, the BLM has been strained by the accelerating renewa-
ble energy “land rush.”  This rush has been compounded by mounting pres-
sure to either streamline the renewable energy development federal approval
process or exempt renewable energy projects altogether.
First, the approval process for projects on federal public lands has been
widely criticized for unnecessarily delaying renewable energy projects, which
will directly contribute to reducing greenhouse gases and U.S. dependence
on foreign oil.103  The need to streamline the process is readily apparent,
98 See id. at 563–64 (noting that wind turbine collision makes up less than half of all
annual bat fatalities).
99 Barotrauma is defined as “hemorrhage in the lungs due to a sudden drop in air
pressure,” and bats must be within one to two meters of wind turbine blades for this to
occur. Id. at 564.
100 Id. (quoting Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540,
579 (D. Md. 2009)).
101 Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Animals: A History of Conflict, 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE
& ENERGY L. 159, 161–62 (2012).
102 See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Biological Diversity, New BLM Plan for California’s
Algodones Dunes Slashes Protections for Rare Species, Undermines Renewable-energy
Planning (Sept. 10, 2012), available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_re
leases/2012/algodones-dunes-09-10-2012.html (criticizing the BLM’s designation of 40,000
acres of rare species habitat for off-road vehicle use “just two days after the BLM assured
the public that conservation measures it would adopt to offset the impacts of large-scale
renewable energy projects in the California desert would be meaningful and enduring”).
103 Ruhl, supra note 95, at 1773–74.
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and the BLM has begun to address this in combination with other federal
agencies.  For example, the Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan
(DRECP) is a joint effort by California and federal agencies to streamline the
permitting process for renewable energy projects.104
Second, some parties advocate for the exemption of renewable energy
projects entirely through the use of a “green pass,” but various environmental
organizations have complained that the FWS is unwilling to enforce the ESA
against renewable energy developers, even when there are “green harms”
that outweigh the “green benefits” on particular sites.  The organizations
argue that this creates a de facto “green pass” exemption for renewable
energy.105  In reality though, the construction of renewable energy projects
create very real harms that cannot be overlooked.  Exempting renewable
energy projects entirely from ESA regulations disincentivizes developers to
take mitigation actions that could greatly help in reducing harm to species
from renewable energy development.106  Thus, while the process may be
viewed as onerous and while there are great environmental and societal ben-
efits to the swift development of renewable energy capacity, there is a net
gain to species when renewable energy developers are required to follow ESA
procedures—this process ensures that actions are taken to reduce harm to
species on development sites.
B. The Private Lands Failure of the ESA
An analysis of the ESA’s effectiveness raises questions regarding whether
the structure of the ESA and its main provisions are achieving the law’s
intended goals.  The three goals of the ESA are as follows: (1) to prevent
species extinction, (2) to secure species’ eventual recovery, and (3) to protect
those species’ ecosystems.107  The ESA has achieved the most success (rela-
tive to the other goals, and not to be confused with actual “success”) in meet-
ing its first goal—only ten species have been officially delisted due to
104 See The Desert Renewable Energy Conservation Plan, DESERT RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSER-
VATION PLAN, http://www.drecp.org/whatisdrecp/ (last updated July 10, 2012) (stating
that the intended purpose of the DRECP is “to advance state and federal conservation
goals in these desert regions while also facilitating the timely permitting of renewable
energy projects under applicable state and federal laws”); see also Ruhl, supra note 95, at
1782–83 (discussing the “Smart from the Start” streamlining initiative proposed by Secre-
tary Salazar in 2010 in response to publicized approval and permitting issues with the Cape
Wind project).
105 See John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL’Y 59, 96–97 (2013) (discussing the “green pass” issue in relation to the Beech
Ridge saga of wind energy projects versus endangered Indiana bats); see also Ruhl, supra
note 95, at 1773–74.  Professor Nagle goes on to provide a comprehensive discussion of the
problems with the “green pass” argument.  Nagle, supra, at 87–92.
106 See Ruhl, supra note 95, at 1781 (positing that “HCPs are an essential, cooperative
tool for balancing the interests of species conservation while still encouraging land-based
wind energy development”).
107 Kieran F. Suckling & Martin Taylor, Critical Habitat and Recovery, in 1 THE ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 4, at 75, 75.
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extinction.108  This is in contrast to data from 2006 indicating that 227 spe-
cies would have been expected to become extinct.109
Nonetheless, the ESA has been widely viewed as falling far short of its
two remaining goals.110  In the area of species recovery, according to the
FWS’s Delisting Report, only thirty species have been delisted due to recov-
ery111 out of 2139 total species listed as endangered or threatened.112  This
amounts to roughly a 1.5% recovery rate, which is attributed to the Service
(FWS or NMFS) involved tending only to manage a species to the point of
minimum population viability rather than substantial recovery.113  This lack
of species recovery can be ascribed to two aspects of the ESA.  First, the ESA
mandates only a plan for recovery as compared to actual recovery114—a focus
on actual recovery of species through increasing its numbers would mean
increasing the populations enough to remove the species from being listed at
all (and would thus mean a higher recovery percentage).  Second, the ESA’s
focus on preventing extinction is explicitly clear, whereas the recovery of a
species to high enough populations to consider it “recovered” and delist the
species entirely is much murkier.115  Additionally, only some of the delisted
species’ successful recoveries can be attributed to the actions of the Service
108 See Delisting Report, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/
DelistingReport.do (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
109 Suckling & Taylor, supra note 107, at 75.
110 See, e.g., Jacqueline Lesley Brown, Preserving Species: The Endangered Species Act Versus
Ecosystem Management Regime, Ecological and Political Considerations, and Recommendations for
Reform, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 151, 171 (1997) (“When measuring the ESA’s success using
the recovery standard as a benchmark, one would probably conclude that the ESA has
failed.” (footnote omitted)).
111 See Delisting Report, supra note 108.
112 See Species Report, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.fws.gov/tess_public/pub/
SpeciesCountReport.do (last visited Mar. 5, 2014) (follow “Species Count Search” hyper-
link; then select “Federal Listing Status” of “Endangered” and “Threatened”; then view
“Species Count Search Results”).
113 Suckling & Taylor, supra note 107, at 75. But see Paulich, supra note 18, at 116–17
(“The species that have recovered because of ESA regulations have often had an identifi-
able threat that regulation could directly address.”); J.B. Ruhl, Keeping the Endangered Species
Act Relevant, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 275, 277 (2009) (“The ESA has long been the
workhorse of species protection in contexts for which a species-specific approach can effec-
tively be employed to address discrete human-induced threats that have straightforward
causal connections to the decline of a species, such as clearing of occupied habitat for
development or damming of a river.”).
114 See Suckling & Taylor, supra note 107, at 75 (noting the explanation of the NMFS
that “‘[t]he [ESA] does not mandate recovery, it mandates a recovery plan’” (quoting
Rebecca Clarren, Dams Will Stand, Salmon Be Damned, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 11, 2004),
http://www.hcn.org/issues/284/15043)).
115 See id. (asserting that the ESA successfully prevents extinction because it has “clear
marching orders” for this goal, whereas the Act does not provide much guidance for the
goal of species recovery).
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under the ESA rather than the actions of other federal initiatives and
national events,116 further watering down the rate of recovery.117
Most central to this Note, the goal of ecosystem protection has also not
been met, despite being difficult to quantify.118  The primary threat to listed
species is habitat loss,119 followed by invasive species.120  There are two veins
to the failure to achieve the ecosystem protection goal—a lack of effective
private land habitat protection and a lack of “critical habitat” designations121
overall.
First, it is estimated that nonfederal land makes up sixty-seven percent of
endangered and threatened species’ habitat, and forty percent of at-risk spe-
cies do not even exist on federal land whatsoever.122  In fact, privately owned
land alone makes up seventy-one percent of the United States if Alaska is
excluded.123  Thus, nonfederal land and private land in particular are a vital
part of species habitat.  Private lands can be more ecologically beneficial to
species as well124—this is because “private lands tend to be more productive,
better watered, and higher in soil quality than public land.”125  Privately
owned land is thus critical to species survival,126 yet the ESA has failed to
preserve critical habitat on privately owned land.  In short, this is because the
ESA has created the wrong incentives for private landowners.127  The Act’s
116 Two prominent examples of this include the recoveries of the Arctic peregrine fal-
con and the brown pelican due the United States’ DDT ban as well as the delisting of three
endangered species of birds on Palau (an island over which the United States exercises
trusteeship) due to the ending of World War II hostilities.  Brown, supra note 110, at 172.
117 See id. at 171–72.
118 Suckling & Taylor, supra note 107, at 75.
119 Jonathan H. Adler, Money or Nothing: The Adverse Environmental Consequences of
Uncompensated Land Use Controls, 49 B.C. L. REV. 301, 335 (2008).
120 Ruhl, supra note 113, at 282.
121 For a discussion of critical habitat designation and section 4, see supra notes 26–28
and accompanying text.
122 Mark L. Shaffer et al., Proactive Habitat Conservation, in 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 4, at 286, 291.
123 See Jodi Hilty & Adina M. Merenlender, Studying Biodiversity on Private Lands, 17
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 132, 133 (2003).
124 Adler, supra note 119, at 301–02.
125 Hilty & Merenlender, supra note 123, at 133; see also Jonathan Adler, The Leaky Ark:
The Failure of Endangered Species Regulation on Private Land, in REBUILDING THE ARK 6, 7
(Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2011) (“Private land is also often . . . ecologically superior to
government lands of the same type.”).
126 See Adler, supra note 119, at 302 n.6 (listing authorities asserting that species recov-
ery cannot be achieved without habitat conservation on private land).
127 Adler, supra note 125, at 6–7 (“One of the primary reasons that the ESA has failed
to realize its objectives is that it is ineffective at preserving habitats that are found on pri-
vate land. . . . At present, most endangered and threatened species’ habitat is privately
owned: over three-quarters of threatened and endangered species rely upon private land
for some or all of their habitat.  Thus, even if all federal lands were managed exclusively for
species conservation, this would be insufficient to save many imperiled species, because a
significant percentage is not even found on federal lands. . . . If the ESA is to be effective at
conserving species by preserving their habitats, it must be effective at doing so on private
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punitive structure has encouraged habitat destruction rather than preserva-
tion, largely because it “fails to adequately address the ‘fundamental tension
between conservation and private development.’”128  This tension can be
alleviated by creating reasons for private landowners to engage in helpful
actions—something which the ESA has come nowhere close to doing with its
current command-and-control, punishment-based structure.129
Second, a lack of critical habitat designation as a whole contributes to
the failure of the ESA to meet its habitat and ecosystem protection goal.
While officials embraced the development of critical habitat in the ESA’s
infancy,130 the Service’s position has changed markedly over the past thirty
years—the FWS website currently indicates that “the critical habitat designa-
tion usually affords little extra protection to most species, and in some cases
it can result in harm to the species.”131  As a result of this position and addi-
tional factors stated on the FWS website, as of May 5, 2009, critical habitat
had only been designated for 523 out of 1317 listed species.132  Finally, the
ESA has been ineffective at addressing biodiversity overall through providing
ecosystem management and protection—species do not live in isolated bub-
bles.133  In sum, the ESA has been effective in pulling species from the brink
land.  However, the ESA’s greatest failing has been species conservation on private land.”
(footnotes omitted)); see also Jeffrey A. Lockwood, The Intent and Implementation of the
Endangered Species Act: A Matter of Scale, in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT 70, 73 (Jason F. Shogren ed., 1998) (“Over one-third of all endangered species are
found exclusively on private property, and about three-quarters of listed species rely on
habitat found on these lands.”).
128 Paulich, supra note 18, at 118–19 (quoting James Boyd et al., The Law and Economics
of Habitat Conservation: Lessons from an Analysis of Easement Acquisitions, 19 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
209, 211 (2000)).
129 See infra Sections III.A–B.
130 See Suckling & Taylor, supra note 107, at 76 (discussing responsible agencies’ and
President Jimmy Carter’s embrace of a critical habitat designation program in the early
years of the ESA).
131 Critical Habitat—What Is It?, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/mid
west/endangered//saving/CriticalHabitatFactSheet.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2013). But
see Suckling & Taylor, supra note 107, at 76–77 (discussing that from January 2000 to
August 2005 critical habitat designations rose from ten to thirty-seven percent due to
increased litigation, but that the Department of the Interior has contentiously fought the
use of the designations in its policy as being ineffective for species recovery despite a lack
of evidence being provided for this theory).
132 See Critical Habitat—What Is It?, supra note 131 (indicating that since a congres-
sional moratorium on listing new species ended in 1996, a low priority has been given to
critical habitat designations due to limited staff resources); see also James Salzman, Evolu-
tion and Application of Critical Habitat Under the Endangered Species Act, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 311, 312 (1990) (“Although critical habitat is among the strongest enforcement provi-
sions of the ESA, critical habitats are never designated for four of five endangered
species.”).
133 See Jonathan Remy Nash, Trading Species: A New Direction for Habitat Trading Programs,
32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7–8 (2007) (discussing the ESA’s failure to consider the fact that
species are linked to each other, providing the example that an “endangered species’
habitat may not support . . . other species’ survival, however, to the extent that the endan-
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of extinction, but has largely failed in its attempts to recover species to levels
required for delisting—and much of this is attributable to a lack of habitat
protection for listed species.134
C. The Catalyst: The Expansion of Renewable Energy Development on Federal
Public Lands Accelerates the Need to Modify Private Lands
Regulation Under the ESA
This Note argues that the expansion of renewable energy development
on federal public lands catalyzes the need to fundamentally change how the
ESA protects critical habitat on private lands.135  Three arguments are con-
nected as follows to achieve this conclusion.  First, the renewable energy
“land rush” of development on federal public lands—which are uniquely
suited for renewable energy development—should not be stopped by the
ESA despite the critical habitat implications for endangered species.136  Sec-
ond, many private lands are better suited and more ecologically beneficial for
endangered and threatened species’ critical habitat than are federal public
lands; and there is far more private than public land in the United States.137
Finally, the combination of this need to divert federal public lands to renewa-
ble energy development and the better suitability of private lands (as com-
pared to public lands) as critical habitat for endangered species uniquely
catalyzes the need to incorporate private property into an effective habitat
preservation scheme under the ESA.
The first premise is that the renewable energy “land rush” should not be
stopped by the ESA.  While it would not be in the interest of endangered
species and environmental protection to allow renewable energy projects on
gered species’ prey may require a broader ecosystem for its survival”); see also Brown, supra
note 110, at 177–80 (criticizing the ESA’s lack of biodiversity and ecosystem consideration
in only adopting a “species-by-species” approach).
134 Additionally, the ESA and its implementing agencies have been criticized for not
considering the effects of ecosystems more broadly than only the isolated ecosystem of a
listed species.  Notably, the ESA only once mentions “ecosystem” in its provisions, thereaf-
ter only referencing “species.” See Brown, supra note 110, at 178–80; Ruhl, supra note 113,
at 287–88.
135 It should be noted that this is a narrow aspect of a much broader series of intercon-
nected environmental concerns and issues surrounding both renewable energy develop-
ment and the current state of the ESA.  Regrettably, not even the tip of the iceberg
regarding the environmental effects of greenhouse gas emissions on ecosystems and spe-
cies alike is within the scope of this Note.
136 This argument could alternatively be characterized as the renewable energy land
rush presenting a net ecological benefit to species in the long run due to the resulting
greenhouse gas reductions, despite the various harms associated with this development to
individual species relying on the land as habitat.
137 This is not to say that federal public lands are never better suited than private lands
for critical habitat designations.  Public lands in the United States are incredibly varied and
diverse, and a blanket statement that federal public lands are universally not as suitable for
critical habitat designations as private lands is not intended.
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federal public lands to circumvent the federal approval process altogether,138
this development push allows for the environmentally important policy of
greenhouse gas reduction to be pursued.  The pursuit of greenhouse gas
reductions, in part through renewable energy development, will present a
net gain to humanity and organisms.139  In addition to the obvious need to
achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, federal public lands (partic-
ularly in the western United States) are uniquely suited for land-based renew-
able energy development.  As stated by Lazerwitz:
The siting of solar and wind projects sufficient to meet utility-scale power
needs requires certain land and resource characteristics uniquely available
on the federal public lands. . . . [A]s a general matter, utility-scale projects
can range in size from a few megawatts . . . to more than 1,000 MW.  Such
projects typically require large, open, and generally level, undeveloped tracts
ranging in size from several thousand acres to more than 50,000 acres.  They
require access for interconnection to major transmission lines.  Finally, and
most importantly, for optimal efficiency, these projects need to be situated
in areas with consistently high levels of sunshine and wind.  Each of the
required characteristics is present in abundance on the federal public lands
in the West, lands that remain largely undeveloped, crossed with major util-
ity transmission lines, and recognized as containing the highest density of
solar and wind resources in the United States.140
The confluence of the benefits to endangered species globally of reducing
greenhouse gas emissions with the unique ability of the federal public lands
to provide optimal land-based renewable energy project siting (due to both
the physical characteristics of the land generally, such as high levels of wind
and sunshine, and the transmission line infrastructure already in place in
parts of the desert southwest) provides a powerful argument in favor of the
continued use and dedication of these lands to renewable energy projects.
The second part of this argument is that while public lands are uniquely
suited for land-based renewable energy development, private lands overall
are actually better suited than federal public lands for designation as critical
habitat.  As previously discussed, this is due to the fact that private lands have
138 See Ruhl, supra note 95, at 1788–93 (arguing that there is no “green pass” for renew-
able energy projects under both the letter and spirit of the ESA); see also supra subsection
II.A.2.
139 See Lazerwitz, supra note 5, at 13-5 (noting that the public interest has helped drive
the increased push for renewable energy development in part due to “increasing recogni-
tion of the adverse impacts from greenhouse gas emissions on air quality and climate
change”); The President’s Climate Action Plan, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT 15 (June
2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateaction
plan.pdf (“The Administration is . . . implementing climate-adaptation strategies that pro-
mote resilience in fish and wildlife populations, forests and other plant communities,
freshwater resources, and the ocean.  Building on these efforts, the President is also
directing federal agencies to identify and evaluate additional approaches to improve our
natural defenses against extreme weather, protect biodiversity and conserve natural
resources in the face of a changing climate . . . .”); see also supra note 58 and accompanying
text.
140 Lazerwitz, supra note 5, at 13-5 to -6.
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the tendency of being better watered, may contain higher soil quality, and
can be more ecologically productive than public lands.141  Compounding
this is the fact that privately owned lands make up the majority of the United
States, and estimates indicate that nonfederal land makes up sixty-seven per-
cent of endangered and threatened species’ habitat.142  As previously dis-
cussed in Section II.B however, the ESA has failed at species preservation on
private land despite its prominence in making up the vast majority of endan-
gered species’ habitat, as well as having failed to designate critical habitat as a
whole.  The result of all of this is that federal public lands have shouldered
the burden of functioning as habitat for endangered species, while the ESA
has failed to incorporate better-suited and more prolific private lands into an
effective critical habitat regime.143
Finally, the culmination of the ultimately beneficial and unprecedented
renewable energy land rush on federal public lands has exacerbated the fail-
ure of the ESA to regulate and encourage preservation of critical habitat on
private lands.  If the ESA’s private land infirmities are not urgently addressed,
the ESA runs the risk of attracting legislation that will serve to weaken it.144
Additionally, this creates the risk of more net habitat loss for endangered
species due to the continuing diversion of federal public lands to the renewa-
ble energy land rush.  This diversion of federal public lands, in combination
with a lack of legislative changes to the ESA that would serve to reverse the
lack of habitat preservation occurring on private land,145 creates a likelihood
of even more habitat loss for endangered species.
In sum, the ESA shortcomings are a twofold dilemma requiring urgent
resolution.  First, the federal public lands are uniquely suited for rapidly
expanding land-based renewable energy development and should be located
on these lands.146  Second, not only has private property failed to be incorpo-
rated into a habitat preservation scheme, but it (rather than federal public
lands) also constitutes the majority of listed species habitat and has been
141 See supra notes 124–26 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 122–23 and accompanying text.
143 For a discussion of why the ESA has failed to regulate private lands, see infra Section
III.A.
144 Evidence of this risk can already be seen in ESA-related legislation proposed by the
112th Congress—all but one of the over two dozen proposed amendments to the ESA
would weaken the ESA and the tools by which the Service can protect listed species. See
Melissa Chalek, The Living Dead: Why One Species’ Interference with Development May Undermine
the Entire Endangered Species Act, 18 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 103 (2013) (“The major-
ity of the amendments proposed in the 112th Congress would have undermined either the
purpose of the ESA or FWS’s expertise in endangered species management.  Several pro-
posed amendments would have explicitly delisted or prohibited initial listing of specific
species.”).
145 See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text.
146 But see Nagle, supra note 105, at 68–70, 92–98 (discussing the harms of renewable
energy development, particularly on classically scenic and pristine landscapes such as the
desert southwest of the United States, and the view of some environmentalists that the
“green harms” of renewable energy projects outweigh the “green benefits”).
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widely deemed as more suitable for species protection.  The result of this
“green clash” is that there is an urgent need for private land ESA reform if
endangered species are to be saved from the threat of extinction.
III. SOLUTIONS: INCENTIVES AND MARKET-BASED APPROACHES
Before addressing the question of how the ESA is to be modified in order
to tackle this “green clash,” an even more fundamental question is asking why
we protect endangered species to begin with.  Francesca Ortiz posits that
both altruism and self-interest are reasons why we attempt to preserve spe-
cies.147  While altruism contributes to the protection of species and environ-
mental conservation as a whole, this is not enough to stop the decline of both
listed and unlisted species.  The “how” of changing the ESA is that it must tap
in to the motive of individual self-interest if it is to survive the land rush of
renewable energy projects.
In what manner is this reform to occur?  The command-and-control
structure of the ESA must be speedily replaced with both positive incentives
and market-based structures if the ESA is to survive the renewable energy
land rush and be effective in assisting species with the main driver of extinc-
tion—habitat loss.148
A. Why the ESA Has Failed to Regulate Private Lands
As previously discussed in Section II.B, the ESA has largely failed in regu-
lating the habitat of listed species on private lands.  Evidence exists that a
critical habitat designation can have the opposite effect of its stated goal of
demarcating habitat required for listed species’ recovery—it can actually
encourage development that harms endangered and threatened species.149
147 Francesca Ortiz, Candidate Conservation Agreements as a Devolutionary Response to
Extinction, 33 GA. L. REV. 413, 413 (1999); see Brown, supra note 110, at 156–62 (providing
a utilitarian perspective of the justifications for species preservation, including biodiversity,
medicinal, and economic benefits); Jason F. Shogren & Patricia H. Hayward, Biological
Effectiveness and Economic Impacts of the Endangered Species Act, in PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, supra note 127, at 48, 58–59 (“Environmental resources pro-
vided by endangered species on private property can supply a flow of direct and indirect
private and social benefits to the property owner.  The services provided by these endan-
gered species and their corresponding levels of biological diversity are multifarious, rang-
ing from basic life support to new genetic material for pharmaceutical purposes.  These
resources provide a nearly limitless set of valuable services . . . .”). But see Bruce Babbitt,
The Endangered Species Act and “Takings”: A Call for Innovation Within the Terms of the Act, 24
ENVTL. L. 355, 359 (1994) (noting the “fundamental premise” of society that valid regula-
tory actions often inconvenience and trammel on an individual’s rights, and thus that one
might view the ESA as an extension of a well-known constraint—planning and zoning
laws).
148 It is also worth noting the reality that these suggested changes to the ESA are infea-
sible in the current political climate, as the majority of proposed ESA amendments in
recent history have been changes that would weaken the Act. See supra note 144 and
accompanying text.
149 Adler, supra note 125, at 12.
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But private land is where the majority of listed species exist, and habitat
destruction is the single biggest threat to endangered species150—so why are
species not being conserved on private land?  Jonathan Adler lays out the
issue as follows:
The most likely culprit is the structure of the ESA itself and the incentives it
creates for private landowners. . . . [T]he ESA penalizes owners of species
habitat and so discourages habitat creation and conservation on private
land.  Under Section 9 . . . it is illegal for a private landowner to engage in
activities that could “harm” an endangered species, including habitat modifi-
cation, without first obtaining a federal permit.  Acquiring permits may be
costly and time consuming, [and create] substantial uncertainty, particularly
for smaller landowners . . . . Section 7 constrains other actions on private
land that are subject to federal permitting requirements.151
These onerous requirements create a negative perception of the ESA for pri-
vate landowners and reduce land values—all of this creates negative incen-
tives for landowners to refrain from preserving listed species habitat.152
Landowners express a widespread fear that a habitat designation of their
land for a listed species will restrict the future economic use of their land,153
and in combination with the fact that the ESA does not compensate for the
loss of land use, the incentive to destroy viable habitat rather than preserve it
is perpetuated.154  Countless examples exist of landowners engaging in pre-
emptive habitat destruction so as to avoid being subject to the ESA’s actual or
perceived obligations, including examples of entire forests being harvested in
order to avoid an endangered species of woodpecker from being found pre-
150 See id. at 11–14.
151 Id. at 14–15.
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act: 10 Myths & Facts, NAT’L AUDUBON SOC’Y 2, http://
web4.audubon.org/news/top10/esa_myths.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (addressing the
“myth” that “[c]ritical habitat is for the sole use of endangered species, and [that] it locks
away land—often private land—from productive use” and  that “[c]ritical habitat designa-
tions invite the federal government into Americans’ backyards” with the response, in part,
that the Congressional Research Service has noted that there is a misperception by the
public “that critical habitat designations create binding federal restrictions on private
lands”); U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Proposes Endangered Species Act Protection and Critical
Habitat Designation for Three Plants in the Southeast, Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV. 1, http://www.fws.gov/cookeville/pdfs/3plants_faq.pdf (last visited Mar. 9,
2014) (“The designation of critical habitat does not affect land ownership or establish a
refuge, wilderness, reserve, preserve, or other conservation area.  A critical habitat designa-
tion does not allow the government or public to access private lands, nor does it require
implementation of restoration, recovery, or enhancement measures by non-federal
landowners.”).
154 Martin B. Main et al., Evaluating Costs of Conservation, 13 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY
1262, 1265 (1999); see also Betsy Carpenter, The Best-Laid Plans, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 4, 1993, at 89 (“The incentives are wrong here.  If I have a rare metal on my property,
its value goes up.  But if a rare bird occupies the land, its value disappears.  We’ve got to
turn it around to make the landowner want to have the bird on his property.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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sent.155  Thus, despite the potential for individual positive actions of particu-
lar landowners, the punitive nature of the ESA creates negative incentives to
destroy habitat that at best creates a zero-sum game, and at worst makes listed
(or potentially listed) species’ habitats worse off than if no critical habitat
designation occurred.
It is the ESA’s command-and-control style of regulation156 that creates
these negative incentives, which in turn lead to preemptive habitat destruc-
tion.  As Nathan Paulich asserts:
[The command-and-control] approach . . . has been largely ineffective at
meeting the ESA’s stated goals because it fails to adequately address the “funda-
mental tension between conservation and private development.”  Furthermore, the
regulation does not properly account for environmental externalities or
public goods problems. . . . By overlooking the costs and benefits of restric-
tions on private landowners, the ESA has had the effect of antagonizing the
very people needed the most to achieve meaningful conservation.157
Paulich has addressed three specific problems created by the ESA’s com-
mand-and-control structure: the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the gov-
ernment’s perverse incentive, and the ESA’s failure to promote active (versus
reactive) habitat management.158  First, the Takings Clause159 has been
interpreted as an extremely high standard for landowners to attempt to
meet160 in challenging an environmental regulation.  This incentivizes land-
155 Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat Destruction Under the Endangered
Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27, 29–30 (2003) (“Systematic studies of the occurrence and
extent of preemption may be rare, but anecdotes abound.  Michael Bean and Lee Ann
Welch note how some forest landowners have harvested mature southern pine in order to
avoid inhabitation of their land by the red-cockaded woodpecker.  A notable case is that of
North Carolina landowner Ben Cone, who dramatically increased his harvest of old-growth
pine in response to potential ESA regulations and who became famous for his confronta-
tions with [FWS] and for his lawsuit that settled out of court.  In Texas, Charles Mann and
Mark Plummer report habitat destruction for the golden-cheeked warbler, and J.B. Ruhl
reports the same for the black-capped vireo.  Albert Gidari finds evidence of clear-cutting
in the Pacific Northwest in order to avoid logging restrictions designed to protect the
northern spotted owl.  In California, and other areas where land development values are
high, Maura Dolan finds similar cases.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Daniel R. Simmons &
Randy T. Simmons, The Endangered Species Act Turns 30, 26 REG. 6, 7 (2003) (noting that the
National Association of Home Builders has published guidance for homeowners with
endangered species present on their land indicating that “the highest level of assurance
that a property owner will not face an ESA issue is to maintain the property in a condition
such that protected species cannot occupy the property” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
156 Paulich defines command-and-control regulation as that which “allows the govern-
ment to prohibit development, limit activities, and control private actions.”  Paulich, supra
note 18, at 118.
157 Id. at 118–19 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
158 Id. at 119–24.
159 U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 5.
160 The seminal takings case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), provided that “there will not be a taking simply because the regulation decreases
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owners to avoid costly litigation that is unlikely to result in a victory and
instead turn to other solutions such as preemptive habitat destruction.161
Second, the command-and-control regime creates a harmful incentive
for the government by which it acts under the misapprehension that regula-
tion is of lower cost than it actually is—the government is not incentivized to
consider tradeoffs in its environmental policy when landowners are unlikely
to be compensated because of a proposed environmental regulation on their
land.162  This creates inefficient environmental policy, as the government
does not consider alternatives.  If a taking is found and the government is
forced to bear the cost of its regulation on private landowners, it will often
abandon the particular environmental restriction as the cost is fully realized
at its correct level.163
Third, command-and-control regulation is inherently reactive with
regard to protecting habitat.  This does not foster practices that preserve
habitat for a listed species’ survival: “The ESA prohibits private landowners
from degrading or destroying habitat and thus deters harmful behavior, but
it does nothing to compel helpful actions.  For meaningful ecosystem and spe-
cies conservation, more must be done than simply having regulation that
punishes landowners who destroy habitat.”164  Thus the structure of the ESA
serves to push costs that should be borne by society broadly (because the
benefits from endangered species preservation are for society as a whole)165
onto a few landowners individually whose land happens to contain listed spe-
cies.166  Thus, the ESA’s current use of punitive regulation on private land-
owners does anything but promote the protection of habitat that is so clearly
needed for species survival.
In sum, federal, state, and local initiatives have all failed to stop the con-
tinued loss of habitat for endangered species, primarily due to the failure of
the ESA to address property rights in a manner that promotes rather than
disincentivizes habitat conservation.
the value of the property as long as there are still viable economic uses the landowner can
undertake.” Paulich, supra note 18, at 121.
161 Paulich, supra note 18, at 120–23.
162 Id.
163 Id.; see Nash, supra note 133, at 9 (“The [ESA] imposes restrictions on activities of
private landowners with respect to endangered species without sufficient regard to the
costs or benefits associated with those restrictions in particular cases.”).
164 Paulich, supra note 18, at 123 (emphasis added).
165 See Brown, supra note 110, at 157–58 (providing a thorough discussion of the bene-
fits to humans of species protection and biodiversity, including the recognition that “[a]s
part of the interconnected web of life, humans depend on any number and combination
of abundant and diverse biological resources, all of which provide crucial services to the
Earth’s ecosystems”).
166 See Shogren & Hayward, supra note 147, at 54; William D. Ruckelshaus, Foreword to
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, supra note 127, at xi, xi (“[The ESA]
unfairly imposes the cost of preservation on a few for the benefit of the many.”).
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B. Shifting from a Punitive to Positive Habitat Protection Structure
The need for a change in the nature of the incentives for private land-
owners to conserve and manage habitat for listed species protection is widely
supported by many, including environmental groups.167  In the 1990s, then-
Secretary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt pushed for incentive-based
approaches including safe harbor agreements, conservation banking, and
financial assistance programs for states and individual landowners, but much
of this went unrealized after his tenure.168  Babbitt also implemented policies
designed to increase the flexibility of the habitat conservation plan (HCP)
process including the “no surprises” rule169 and a step-by-step handbook.170
The development of HCPs was a step in the right direction (and was particu-
larly successful for larger landowners),171 but the continued high costs and
lengthy approval process make this an unrealistic avenue for small landown-
ers today.172
With these attempted incentive-based reforms as a background, the ESA
must forge ahead to create incentive structures for small and large private
landowners alike that create feasible, positive incentives for habitat protec-
tion and actions that promote species coexistence on private land.  All of this
must be done in light of the imminent conversion of vast amounts of federal
land to renewable energy project designation by the BLM.
W.H. “Buzz” Fawcett refers to this new positive incentive structure as a
“conservation economy” and advocates for its placement as a new “recovery
167 Lockwood, supra note 127, at 83 (“The need to shift the emphasis from punishment
to positive reinforcement is probably the most widely endorsed modification of the ESA’s
implementation, with support coming from the National Wildlife Federation, the Audu-
bon Society, the Environmental Defense Fund, the Interior Department, and the National
Wilderness Institute.” (footnotes omitted)).  Additionally, it should be noted that this is
not a new approach.  “Aldo Leopold long ago argued that conservation policy ultimately
boil[s] down to reward[ing] the private landowner who conserves the public interest.”
Gregory M. Parkhurst & Jason F. Shogren, Incentive Mechanisms, in 1 THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 4, at 247, 247 (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
168 Frank W. Davis et al., Renewing the Conservation Commitment, in 1 THE ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT AT THIRTY, supra note 4, at 296, 304.  For more information on these specific
types of incentive-based approaches, see Paulich, supra note 18, at 132–54.
169 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
170 Douglas P. Wheeler & Ryan M. Rowberry, Habitat Conservation Plans and the Endan-
gered Species Act, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 220, 224–25 (Donald C. Baur & Wm. Robert
Irvin eds., 2d ed. 2010).
171 See Paulich, supra note 18, at 132–34 (“Although larger landowners see HCPs as a
way of minimizing some of the costs of complying with the ESA, the high transaction costs
and often extended approval process can discourage small landowners from preparing
HCPs.”).
172 For a discussion of the limits of the current HCP regime, see supra notes 35–40 and
accompanying text; see also Paulich, supra note 18, at 132–34; Shaffer et al., supra note 122,
at 287.
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section” in the ESA.173  As recognized by Fawcett, one important benefit of
including this scheme in the ESA itself is that it would become a “source of
permanent funding that could not be appropriated for other means.”174
Babbitt began this process by demonstrating his desire to accommodate the
capitalistic motives of private landowners—this was not ultimately successful
in regard to small landowners, but in the wake of renewable energy expan-
sion on federal public lands the need to head in this direction is being rap-
idly catalyzed.  There is a much greater chance of harmonizing these green
initiatives through “utilizing the forces of the economy.”175
C. Positive Incentives
What are the means by which the “forces of the economy” may be used
to incentivize private landowners to engage in feasible habitat preservation
practices?  While there are certainly others, the two that present the most
realizable benefits and ease of use to private landowners are subsidies and
market-based approaches.
1. Subsidies
Gregory M. Parkhurst and Jason F. Shogren nimbly present subsidies as
a positive incentive mechanism for private landowners, indicating that
“[s]ubsidies are financial assistance offered to landowners by regulators.  Sub-
sidies encourage landowners to maintain their land in an undeveloped state
or to mitigate the environmental impact of development . . . .”176  They are
commonly distributed by federal or state agencies through grants, direct cash
payments, or tax allowances and funded by a combination of tax revenue,
lottery funds, and special permits.177
Programs of this type are not without critics however—incentivizing pos-
itive landowner behavior with regard to endangered species is seen by some
as costly178 and as compensating regulation that should be followed regard-
less.179  Nonetheless, in the wake of massive federal public lands expansion
and the recognized failure of the ESA to preserve the habitat (the primary
173 W.H. “Buzz” Fawcett, Refocusing the Endangered Species Act: A Regulated Community Per-
spective, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, supra note 170, at 394, 405–06.
174 Id. at 406.
175 Id.
176 Parkhurst & Shogren, supra note 167, at 247–48.
177 Id.
178 See, e.g., Juliet Eilperin, Pentagon Issues ‘Credits’ to Offset Harm to Wildlife, WASH. POST
(Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/08/
AR2009020802128.html?hpid=moreheadlines.
179 See Adler, supra note 119, at 313 (noting the argument of environmentalists who
oppose a compensation scheme that environmental regulation cannot be compensatory
without sacrificing effective conservation).
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factor leading to successful conservation), this approach will ultimately lead
to a net gain.180
One major benefit of subsidies, such as tax incentives, is flexibility.181
While a recognized downside of subsidies is the potentially high cost of
implementation,182 tax incentives have the advantage of being worked into
the existing tax code, and thus already have infrastructure in place.183  Addi-
tionally, while the government would lose some money in tax revenue, this
may be at least partially offset by lower FWS spending needs for habitat con-
servation initiatives and by an ability to allocate more federal public lands to
renewable energy development, generating revenue from the leases involved.
Subsidies would successfully incentivize landowners not to preemptively
destroy habitat—in fact, they have the potential to promote proactive habitat
management rather than reactive “emergency room conservation.”184  This is
something the ESA has not been able to do since its passing forty years ago.
One important issue with tax subsidies is addressed by Kevin M. Walsh—
there is substantial uncertainty surrounding their use because Congress may
or may not renew them.185  For a tax subsidy regime to work in the habitat
protection context, Congress would need to commit to long-term use for a
specified amount of time (for example, a thirty-year time period) in order to
minimize this uncertainty.  An important additional note is the use and suc-
180 It should be noted that specific steps landowners could take to reap the benefits of
positive incentives are outside the scope of this Note.  However, it is worth emphasizing
that a private landowner’s development and use of his or her land may not need to be
entirely blocked in order to reap the benefits of a tax credit.  For example, a private land-
owner may wish to build a house on her land, while also protecting an endangered species
of bird, in order to be eligible for a tax credit.  Should the landowner provide documenta-
tion of her purchase and/or maintenance of the plants on which this species of bird relies,
she may qualify for the tax credit.  Worked into the tax code, this is similar to the docu-
mentation requirements of the IRS in countless code sections.
181 Paulich, supra note 18, at 142.
182 See id.
183 Brown, supra note 110, at 247.  Additional benefits of the tax code approach include
the ability of legislators to use it to mold individual development decisions and the tax
code’s reach to all economic entities (including small individual landowners that are hard
to reach otherwise). Id.
While outside the scope of this Note to address in greater detail, Brown goes on to
provide a comprehensive look at various specific forms of tax incentives that could be
implemented, including state and local property tax credits, tax credits for habitat
improvement expenses, deductions for revenues gain from preservation efforts (i.e., from
engaging in beneficial ecological tourism), estate tax reform for habitat conservation, and
tax credits for small landowners’ expenditures to comply with the ESA. Id. at 246–55.  For
a discussion of the considerable success of the Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit,
see supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
184 See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
185 See Walsh, supra note 54, at 209–10 (addressing this limitation in the context of
renewable energy, but the same limitation applies in the context of potential habitat pro-
tection and mitigation subsidies).
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cess of renewable energy tax credits in recent years.186  Critics of the use of
tax credits with regard to the ESA need only turn to the increasing (and
successful) use of tax credits in the renewable energy sector to silence the
argument that tax credits under the ESA would not be feasible.
2. Market-Based Approaches
Market-based approaches are another form of positive incentives that
provide flexibility for individual landowners while incentivizing habitat con-
servation.  Nathan Paulich recognizes that “[a]n alternative to a government
compensation program is creating markets where private landowners are
rewarded for their conservation efforts.  Markets offer a promising tool for
conservation efforts because they replace bureaucratic decision-making with
basic economic incentives to coordinate more efficient decisions by private
actors.”187  Additionally, there is evidence for the proposition that an at least
partially privately run system is better ecologically than a purely government-
based system.188
These market-based incentives may, and ideally should, come in various
forms, including conservation banking,189 tradable development rights pro-
grams,190 and recovery crediting.191  While any single mechanism may not be
able to provide a broad solution for all types of landowners, the implementa-
tion of a flexible variety of tools to foster private landowners to protect
habitat is the best strategy—“to be successful[,] incentives must align private
landowners’ interest with conservation needs.”192  These market-based
approaches are in their early stages, and employing a variety of approaches in
186 See Lazerwitz, supra note 5, at 13-5 (“[Incentive] programs include the federal pro-
duction tax credit for wind power and investment tax credit for solar power, which provide
tax incentives of up to 30%.  Congress recently extended these programs in the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which went a step further by creating grants-in-
lieu of tax credits and directing hundreds of millions of dollars to research, development,
and loan programs.”); see also Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE
INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/finre
.cfm (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (providing a comprehensive table of the various types of
financial incentives for renewable energy in each state and at the federal level).
187 Paulich, supra note 18, at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188 Id. (citing Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental Protec-
tion, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 671 (2001)).
189 See id. at 147–51 (discussing conservation banking); Parkhurst & Shogren, supra
note 167, at 249 (same); R. Neal Wilkins, Improving the ESA’s Performance on Private Land, in
REBUILDING THE ARK, supra note 125, at 56, 64–65 (same).
190 Parkhurst & Shogren, supra note 167, at 248–49 (discussing TDRs in detail); Pau-
lich, supra note 18, at 151–53 (same).
191 See Wilkins, supra note 189, at 66–69 (discussing recovery credits).
192 Paulich, supra note 18, at 155; see also Wilkins, supra note 189, at 71–72 (“By having
a variety of instruments available, conservationists are more likely to achieve a higher
return on investment from available conservation funding. . . . For endangered species
recovery, a regulatory framework that encourages testing of a wide variety of market-based
approaches but then requires independent evaluation and public scrutiny of results would
be superior to the more cautious approach taken thus far.”).
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the wake of rapid renewable energy development on public lands will help
the strengths and weaknesses of each come to light.  Ultimately this process
will form better public policy that more effectively addresses positive incen-
tives for private landowners.
D. Why This Will Work
A question that remains to be more fully fleshed out is why these tax
incentive and market-based approaches will work in pushing private land-
owners to protect habitat as opposed to the current command-and-control
structure of the ESA.  First, these approaches activate personal norms.  As
stated by Michael P. Vandenbergh, “One of the greatest problems facing
norms theorists and regulators is how to induce individuals to act who will
not benefit personally and who are not subject to legal or social sanc-
tions.”193  Vandenbergh goes on to state that the large number of unregu-
lated individuals in the scope of environmental law remains the biggest
challenge to effective environmental regulation today.194  Positively incen-
tivizing the behavior of private landowners through norm activation thus
helps to redistribute some of the costs borne by those landowners having
endangered species on their land onto those realizing the benefits—the
American public.195  Thus, the costs are more fairly spread out from a few
individual landowners onto society more broadly.
Next, incentivizing habitat protection within private ownership fulfills
the principle of “reconciliation ecology”—this involves “using land better,
instead of setting land aside.”196  Positive incentives facilitate proactive con-
servation, so that the “emergency room conservation” that is characteristic
today is no longer needed.197  Positive incentives will also help end anti-con-
servation measures and sentiment, which are often fueled by the lack of com-
pensation to private landowners.198
193 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal Norm Activation
Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101, 1101 (2005).
194 Id. at 1101–02. See generally Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 155 (2011) (addressing the dichotomy between regulating the indi-
vidual as compared to industry with regard to environmental harms, the reasons why this
dichotomy exists, and how the schism can be addressed); Michael P. Vandenbergh, From
Smokestack to SUV: The Individual as Regulated Entity in the New Era of Environmental Law, 57
VAND. L. REV. 515 (2004) (discussing the fact that the individual is often the largest remain-
ing polluter and creator of environmental harms today).
195 See Ruckelshaus, supra note 166, at xii.
196 Michael L. Rosenzweig, Beyond Set-Asides, in 1 THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT
THIRTY, supra note 4, at 259, 265.
197 See Brown, supra note 110, at 185 (discussing that the current ESA regime is only
focused on imminent threats rather than proactive preservation); see also Shaffer et al.,
supra note 122, at 289 (“[C]onservation efforts are likely to be more successful and less
expensive if we design and protect adequate habitat conservation areas before species
become threatened or endangered.”).
198 Adler, supra note 125, at 18 (“Protecting private landowners from potential negative
consequences of owning endangered species habitat—either by ending the regulation of
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Finally, positive incentive approaches must remain flexible if they are to
be a viable solution to the accelerating designation of federal public lands for
renewable energy projects and the need for critical habitat for listed species.
This need has been referred to as a “flexible menu” for habitat preserva-
tion.199  Because individual landowners and individual species have differing
needs, there is no one approach that will work for all parties.
It must be recognized that positive incentive mechanisms are not with-
out their downsides.  Challenges facing the use of incentive mechanisms
include “the need to simplify associated administrative processes, provide
predictable levels of funding, harmonize state and federal requirements, and
clarify the application of existing incentive tools to particular land ownership
situations.”200  Streamlining the process for small private landowners to suc-
cessfully take part in incentive mechanisms, particularly those that are gov-
ernment-based,201 is a key challenge because landowners are not willing to
take part in “cumbersome incentive programs.”202
Ultimately, changes that address the failure of the ESA to effectively reg-
ulate private land ownership must do so with the premise at the forefront of
ensuring that those landowners who do have endangered species present on
their land (and even those that do not) are not unfairly shouldering the bur-
den of habitat preservation when it should be assumed by society as a whole.
Positively incentivizing these landowners will assist in redistributing this socie-
tal burden fairly, increasing habitat protection on private lands so that fed-
eral public lands may be dedicated, without conflict with the ESA, to
renewable energy expansion—ultimately resulting in a net benefit to human-
ity and organisms.
habitat modification or ensuring that landowners are compensated when their ability to
make reasonable use of their land is limited for the benefit of an endangered species—
would remove the largest obstacle to greater landowner participation in conservation
efforts.  Many landowners are very willing to cooperate with conservation goals so long as
they are not forced to bear the lion’s share of the cost.”).  As noted by Adler, an additional
benefit of positive incentives is that they improve the available science upon which the
listing of species rests. Id. at 19–23.
199 See Shaffer et al., supra note 122, at 292–95; see also Ruckelshaus, supra note 166, at
xii (“An increasing body of evidence in environmental regulation indicates that allowing
flexibility in the means of attaining required performance goals is more likely to result in
their successful achievement.”).
200 Michael J. Bean, Landowner Incentives and the Endangered Species Act, in ENDANGERED
SPECIES ACT, supra note 170, at 206, 214.
201 Davis et al., supra note 168, at 304–05 (“Creation of ‘one-stop shopping’ Web sites
and offices where landowners could obtain information on the habitat and species conser-
vation programs available from all agencies would help to relieve landowner frustration.”).
202 Id. at 304 (discussing the need for streamlining as evidenced by the inability of small
individual landowners to take part in the HCP process in the 1990s due to the “labyrinth of
ESA-related processes and programs”).
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CONCLUSION
An assessment of the ESA as it stands today results in the understanding
that the Act has failed to regulate critical habitat on private lands in the
United States, while renewable energy development on federal public lands
has experienced a “land rush” that has been compared to that of a modern-
day gold rush.203  This renewable energy expansion should be given prece-
dence on the federal public lands—the benefits stemming from renewable
energy’s role in increasing non-carbon based sources of energy are too great,
and the federal public lands are too ideally suited for land-based renewable
energy projects not to move forward.  Simultaneously, it must be recognized
that private lands are often better suited as critical habitat for threatened and
endangered species than public lands—ecologically as well as in terms of
making up the vast majority of land ownership in the United States.  This
Note has argued that the confluence of the renewable energy land rush and
the failure of the ESA to effectively protect and conserve habitat for endan-
gered species has catalyzed the need for imminent changes in how the ESA
regulates private landowners.  Positive incentives that encourage preemptive
habitat preservation, rather than preemptive destruction, must be swiftly
implemented within the ESA.
“The [ESA] is a time capsule, and each time it is opened we have to deal
with the fact that its fabric is crumbling over time.  The sooner we realize the
limitations of the current statutory text and open ourselves up to the pos-
sibilities of the future, the better.”204
203 For a comparison to the California Gold Rush of 1848, see Lazerwitz, supra note 5,
at 13-2 to -3.
204 Fawcett, supra note 173, at 406.
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